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PSYCHIATRIC INJURY CLAIMS AND PREGNANCY: RE (A MINOR) AND OTHERS V 
CALDERDALE & HUDDERSFIELD NHS FOUNDATION TRUST [2017] EWHC 824 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This claim arose following the alleged negligent delivery of a baby, RE, by the Defendant, 
Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS Foundation Trust. RE’s claim for physical injury will 
not be the focus of this commentary, which instead focuses on the claims for psychiatric 
injury by her mother, LE, and her grandmother, DE. Both adults experienced post 
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result of observing the labour, which lasted 
approximately 10 hours.   
Liability for psychiatric injury is treated differently in law from physical injury. 
There are additional control mechanisms and liability depends on whether the claimant 
is classified as a primary or secondary victim. There were two main issues that arose in 
relation to LE and DE’s claims: (i) whether LE (the mother) was a primary victim and (ii) 
whether the sight of the birth was sufficient to be classed as a sudden shocking event.1 
This commentary explores the reasoning and implications for the judge’s findings that 
(i) LE was a primary victim and (ii) that the birth was a sudden shocking event. Both of 
these findings meant that LE and DE’s clinical negligence claims were successful. It will 
be argued that both findings are justifiable based on existing principles of tort law. In 
addition, the finding that LE was a primary victim affirms the important principle that a 
fetus inside a pregnant woman is, legally, to be treated as a part of the woman’s body. 
                                                        
1 The commentary refers to this requirement as a ‘sudden shocking event’ as others have also 
done in this context, see Burrows, AS and Burrows, JH (2016) ‘A shocking requirement in the law 
on negligence liability for psychatric illness: Liverpool Women's Hopsital NHS Foundation Trust v 
Ronayne [2015] EWCA Civ 588’ 24 Medical Law Review 278. 
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The principled implications of a different finding would have been concerning and 
potentially wide-ranging. However, beyond that, the implications of the judgment do 
raise some concerns. In particular, the fact that birth can constitute a shocking event 
arguably challenges the work done to normalise pregnancy and childbirth and relatedly 
to de-medicalise it.2 Secondly, the possibility of an expansion in claims resulting from 
any loosening of the Alcock criteria requires careful analysis. It will be considered that 
the court, in reaching this decision, failed to take into account the implications of 
widening recovery, particularly for healthcare professionals, and resource pressures on 
the NHS. These two challenges will be explored following a consideration of the facts of 
the case and the legal principles that applied to it.  
 
THE FACTS 
 
The case concerned a clinical negligence claim which arose out of an alleged negligent 
delivery at a midwifery led unit run by the Defendant Trust. The baby suffered an acute 
profound hypoxic ischaemic insult immediately prior to delivery, which was found to be 
the result of a negligent delay. The difficulties in the baby’s birth partly arose as she was 
expected to be macrosomic (being over a birth weight of 4.5kg). It was found that she 
probably suffered from shoulder dystocia during the course of delivery. The Claimants 
alleged that the Trust failed to anticipate the risk of shoulder dystocia, given that the 
baby was known to be large, and when that risk materialised they fell below the 
expected standard of care in dealing with it. Mr Justice Goss held that, in summary, there 
were negligent failures to: recognise the possibility of shoulder dystocia, diagnose the 
potential shoulder dystocia and, at that point of potential diagnosis, summon help 
immediately. The failure by the midwife to summon assistance was found to be 
negligent, as was the fact that she prevented the obstetrician from entering the room for 
                                                        
2 See for example the discussion in Ebtehaj, F, Herring, J, Johnson, MH and Richards, M (eds), 
Birth Rites and Rights (Hart 2011). 
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one minute when he did arrive. It was held that, as a result of these actions, there was a 
negligent delay in delivery of 11 minutes, which, if avoided, would have ensured RE 
avoided all damage.  
In relation to the claim for psychiatric injury resulting from the negligence 
outlined above, LE and DE described seeing a ‘lifeless’ body and that RE’s head was 
‘purple and swollen’.3 LE thought her baby was dead and it was held by the judge that 
LE’s PTSD was caused by ‘the birth of a flat, apnoeic baby’.4 Similarly, DE’s claim was 
successful on the basis that she had observed the events of the birth and they were 
‘sufficiently sudden, shocking and objectively horrifying’.5 
 
PSYCHIATRIC INJURY CLAIMS IN THE CLINICAL NEGLIGENCE CONTEXT 
 
The law on recovery for psychiatric injury is different depending on whether a person is 
deemed to be a primary or a secondary victim. Both potential classes of claimant need to 
show that they have a recognised psychiatric illness, which in this case was satisfied as 
both claimants had PTSD. Primary victims need to prove that they were in the zone of 
physical danger.6 This means that they only need to show that physical injury was 
foreseeable, not psychiatric injury. Therefore LE, being an active participant in the 
labour, and suffering the psychiatric injury as a result of events that occurred when RE 
was still partially inside her, was deemed to be a primary victim. 
Consistency with existing principles of law required that LE be found to be a 
primary victim. Legally, a fetus is not a recognised person until birth.7 This is the case 
for claims brought by a child injured in utero as their claim only crystallizes at the point 
                                                        
3 RE (a minor) and others v Calderdale & Huddersfield NHS Foundation Trust [2017] EWHC 824 
para. 42. 
4 Ibid para. 46. 
5 Ibid para. 48. 
6 Page v Smith [1996] 1 AC 155. 
7 Paton v BPAS [1979] QB 276. 
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of birth.8 Therefore it would be inconsistent not to recognise a mother’s ability to claim 
for an experience that took place before birth. In fact, it would appear nonsensical to 
argue that because RE’s head was partially outside of LE’s body that somehow this 
changed the legal position. Furthermore, in a practical sense LE was in the zone of 
physical danger, which she could not leave. Whilst childbirth in the UK is generally safe, 
it remains a potentially dangerous experience depending on various risk factors.9 
Despite concerns about the impact this could have on expanding liability, some of which 
are identified later, it would have been inconsistent to have found any other way on this 
issue. In the context of pregnancy, the law must hold a firm line in protecting a pregnant 
woman’s bodily autonomy and confirming this in the clearest possible terms in this case 
was the right thing to do.10 
In contrast, there are additional control mechanisms for secondary victims, as 
outlined in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire.11 That case arose out of the 
Hillsborough disaster and was brought by friends and relatives of those who were 
crushed in the stadium. In summary, their unsuccessful claim for psychiatric injury was 
based on viewing their loved ones being crushed at the stadium (or its aftermath) 
through various forms of media or in person from other areas of the stadium.  Alcock 
established three additional proximity criteria that secondary victims would have to 
satisfy to be able to recover for psychiatric injury: proximity of relationship, proximity 
of time and space, proximity of perception. None of these three criteria were at issue in 
                                                        
8 Burton v Islington Health Authority; De Martell v Merton and Sutton Health Authority [1993] QB 
204. 
9 In the UK the maternal mortality rate is low at 9 deaths per 100,000 live births, see World 
Health Organization, ‘Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births)’ 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT?locations=GB> accessed 1 June 2017. 
However, there are other injuries associated with childbirth and specifically shoulder dystocia 
which occurred in this case, see Gurol-Urganci, I, Cromwell, DA, Edozien, LC, Mahmood, TA, 
Adams, EJ, Richmond, DH, Templeton, A and van der Meulen, JH (2013) ‘Third- and fourth-degree 
perineal tears among primiparous women in England between 2000 and 2012: time trends and 
risk factors’ 120 BJOG: An International Journal of Obstetrics & Gynaecology 1516. 
10 Notwithstanding that in many instances the law has not always fully protected a pregnant 
woman’s autonomy in this way, particularly in relation to women who are found to lack the 
capacity to make decisions, for a further discussion see Halliday, S, Autonomy and Pregnancy: A 
Comparative Analysis of Compelled Obstetric Intervention (Routledge 2016). 
11 [1992] 1 AC 310. 
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the present case given that DE was in a close relationship with the victims (she was the 
mother and grandmother), she witnessed the scene of the event directly as it happened 
and she viewed it with her own senses. However, the difficulty for DE was in 
establishing the final criteria set down in Alcock – that the injury must be caused by a 
sudden, shocking event. Lord Ackner described this as ‘the sudden appreciation by sight 
or sound of a horrifying event, which violently agitates the mind.’12 Therefore a shocking 
or horrifying event that is gradual in nature would not generally be sufficient to 
establish liability. 
There is a line of clinical negligence cases where the shocking event requirement 
was in issue and which help to elucidate this area of law. It is clear from these cases that 
there are inconsistencies as to how the law is applied and to which scenarios, 
particularly in the clinical context. For example, in North Glamorgan NHS Trust v 
Walters13 a mother successfully claimed damages for psychiatric injury suffered as a 
result of events leading to the death of her baby son. The Defendant Trust had failed to 
diagnose her son’s acute hepatitis as a result of which he suffered a seizure witnessed by 
the mother. The sudden shocking event culminated in the mother agreeing to terminate 
life support and her baby son died in her arms. In Walters this event occurred over a 36 
hour period yet was still treated as a sudden shocking event. In contrast, in Liverpool 
Women’s Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v Ronayne14 a 36 hour deterioration in the 
claimant’s wife’s condition following a hysterectomy was not treated as a sudden 
shocking event. Wider issues appeared to have been taken into account in Ronayne, for 
example it was said that the claimant should have known what to expect and that he 
knew his wife’s life was in danger.15 To some extent this is understandable, as 
witnessing a loved one in hospital inevitably involves some degree of expectation of 
                                                        
12 Ibid 401. 
13 [2002] EWCA Civ 1792. 
14 [2015] EWCA Civ 588. 
15 Ibid para. 37. 
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stress. However, there appears from the case law to be little consistency as to how this 
requirement is applied, with time clearly not the determinative factor.  
In the present case both LE and DE’s claims were found to satisfy the sudden 
shocking event requirement. Despite finding that LE was a primary victim, Goss J also 
went on to consider whether she would satisfy the requirements for a claim as a 
secondary victim in the event that he was wrong in that conclusion. Focusing on the 
sudden shocking event requirement, he said in relation to LE that ‘this was an outwardly 
shocking experience that was exceptional in nature and horrifying as judged by 
objective standards and by reference to persons of ordinary susceptibility’.16 DE’s claim 
succeeded on the basis that ‘her first-hand observation of the first 15 minutes of life’ 
was the triggering event for the PTSD,17 thereby focusing on the post-birth period. In 
relation to DE’s claim there was very little separate analysis of how the sudden shocking 
event requirement applied to the birth itself.  
The decision on this point could be criticised on the basis that childbirth is not a 
sudden event but takes place over an extended period of time. Even if the finding in 
relation to DE related to the post-birth observations of RE rather than the birth itself, 
again this was arguably still not sufficiently sudden given that the events leading up to it 
(i.e. the birth) lasted around 10 hours. However, it is important in these cases to focus 
on the key period in which the negligence occurred, which in this case lasted around one 
hour. If the midwives had responded differently within that period of time, the outcome 
would have been very different. In fact, the negligent delay in delivery was only a matter 
of 11 minutes. Therefore the arguably shocking element of the birth was appropriately 
found to be sudden, albeit that the overall experience may have lasted much longer.  
 
BIRTH AS A SHOCKING EVENT? 
 
                                                        
16 Above, n 3 para. 47. 
17 Ibid para. 48. 
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One difficulty with this case arises in relation to the finding that the birth was a shocking 
event. Of course, childbirth is in many ways shocking: it often occurs over an extended 
period of time, sometimes a matter of days, it is usually extremely painful and it can 
involve the risk of death or serious bodily injury for both the woman and child. 
Childbirth is often presented through imagery of pain and distress, albeit accompanied 
by subsequent joy. Therefore it is perhaps unsurprising that childbirth was found to be a 
‘sufficiently sudden, shocking and objectively horrifying’18 event in this case. 
However, despite the obvious dangers of childbirth, it is a still normal life 
experience, which the human species relies upon for its existence. Turning what is a 
normal and necessary life experience into a medically and legally recognised cause of 
psychiatric harm19 has potentially dangerous consequences in the way that we view 
childbirth, both from a legal and social perspective. Thus, as McGuinness states ‘we must 
recognise how law’s manipulation of women and their (potential) reproductive choices 
shapes social norms and expectations.’20 Similarly, when law frames childbirth as a 
sudden, shocking and horrifying event such that it can create psychiatric injury in 
others, it characterises childbirth as dangerous and abnormal. 
Furthermore, the key difference between LE and DE’s position was that DE could 
choose to leave if she found it too horrifying, LE could not; she was actively involved in 
the event and had to see it through. DE, whilst understandably wanting to provide 
support, ultimately did not have to be there if she found the events too shocking. 
Moreover, even if the birth was found, as in this case, to be sufficiently shocking, it 
would be so irrespective of the (failure of) medical intervention. Had LE given birth at 
home without any medical assistance, it is likely that a similar course of events would 
have unfolded given the size of her baby. Yet in those circumstances there would have 
                                                        
18 Above, n 3 para. 48. 
19 For an interesting discussion of these issues see Ahuja, J (2015) ‘Liability for psychological and 
psychiatric harm: the road to recovery’ 23 Medical law review 27. 
20 McGuinness, S, ‘Legal commentary - giving birth, foetal subjectivity, and harm’ in Smith, S and 
others (eds), Ethical Judgments: Re-Writing Medical Law (Hart 2016) 241. 
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been no professionals on whom to impose a duty of care, meaning that LE and DE would 
not have been able to recover for their, probably identical, injury. Should the fact that 
this ‘sudden shocking event’ occurred within a healthcare setting be sufficient to impose 
liability and change what was undoubtedly an extremely distressing experience into a 
legally recoverable one? The failure to act did not cause the sudden shocking event; it 
failed to prevent it. Of course once a healthcare professional is involved and negligently 
fails to take steps to avoid the unwanted outcome the law should step in to provide 
redress and therefore the judgment is evidently legally justifiable. However, whilst 
recovery in the individual case may seem fair, there is a symbolic risk that the decision 
articulates something harmful about how reproduction is viewed by law and society. 
Characterisations that frame childbirth as shocking and horrifying could have a wider 
impact on how pregnant women are treated in law and undermine the struggle to 
ensure a pregnant woman’s autonomy is respected.  
 
IMPLICATIONS OF EXPANDING RECOVERY FOR PSYCHIATRIC INJURY 
 
Whilst the decision may be justifiable on legal principles, the implications of extending 
the scope of recovery for secondary victims must also be considered. In particular, the 
potential cost to the NHS, and therefore the public, could continue to grow as secondary 
victim claims for psychiatric injury rise. Burrows and Burrows state that Ronayne was a 
‘very rare example of a case in which a medical negligence claim for psychiatric illness 
by a secondary victim succeeded’.21 However, particularly given the finding in this case, 
it must be remembered that the fact there are cases where claims for psychiatric injury 
have been successful will impact upon the out of court settlement of the many other 
cases that do not reach trial.22 
                                                        
21 Above, n 1 281. 
22 This is because so few clinical negligence cases (and civil law cases generally) reach trial, see A 
Ritchie QC, ‘Summary of the Personal Injury and Clinical Negligence Claims Market in England 
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 Furthermore, clinical negligence litigation costs and settlement awards are 
growing as data from NHS Resolution confirms. Over £1.1 billion worth of clinical 
negligence payments were made in 2012/13 followed by a slight drop for two years, 
rising to a peak of over £1.3 billion in the 2015/16 financial year.23 Furthermore, as at 
31 March 2016, an estimate of potential clinical negligence liabilities stood at £56 
billion.24 As a society we have to consider how best to allocate scarce healthcare 
resources. That is not strictly a legal question and therefore the courts should not be 
criticised for decisions that expand liability. However, for those with a wider interest in 
the healthcare context of the UK, the political dimension of this decision should not be 
ignored. Following the Court of Appeal’s rejection of the claimant’s claim for psychiatric 
injury in Ronayne, the lawyer representing the Trust said:25 
 
To have allowed recovery in this case, would be to allow recovery for 
almost any person who developed a psychiatric disorder after 
witnessing their loved ones in a hospital setting following treatment for 
clinical negligence. Such a wide ambit for recovery would significantly 
increase the NHS's liability for clinical negligence claims. 
 
This case raises important questions that need to be asked in light of well-publicised 
financial constraints on the NHS. These difficult birth injury cases usually only turn on a 
matter of minutes where difficult judgements are made under high-pressure 
circumstances. Of course healthcare professionals should be and are trained to deal with 
                                                                                                                                                              
and Wales July 2015’ 
<http://www.9goughsquare.co.uk/uploadedFiles/CN&PIMarketReview2015AR.pdf> accessed 5 
June 2017. Also see NHS Litigation Authority, ‘Annual report and accounts 2015/16’ 
<http://www.nhsla.com/AboutUs/Documents/NHS_Litigation_Authority_Annual_Report_and_Ac
counts_2015-2016.pdf> accessed 5 June 2017. 
23 The NHS Litigation Authority, ‘Factsheet 2: financial information – 2015-16’ 
<http://www.nhsla.com/currentactivity/Documents/NHS%20LA%20Factsheet%202%20-
%20financial%20information%20-%202015-16.pdf > accessed 1 June 2017. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Miller, J (2015) ‘"Michelin Man" case deflates’ 165 New Law Journal 4. 
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those situations. However, if costs do noticeably increase and litigation has a 
detrimental impact on those already under strain NHS employees, we could reach a 
situation where NHS hospitals feel they have no choice but to prevent friends and family 
from being present with a patient to avoid potential liability. This is clearly an extreme 
scenario which is not yet close to materialising, but the unintended consequences of any 
expansion of liability in this context need to be taken seriously. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This case has the potential to broaden the scope of recoverability for psychiatric injury 
for both primary and secondary victims. It has been argued that the claim by the former 
was justified but the latter raises some concerns, particularly in relation to the 
applicability of the sudden shocking event requirement to childbirth and floodgates 
arguments. It remains to be seen whether this case is an exception to the generally 
restrictive approach taken to secondary victim liability or whether it represents an 
emerging trend to expand liability in this area. However, the possibility of a loss of 
certainty and the implications of any expansion of liability in the NHS context are factors 
that should not be ignored. 
 
